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ABSTRACT 
Literature suggests that opportunism in strategic alliances reduces performance by 
limiting collaborative opportunities, inciting retaliation, and causing reputational 
damage. While acknowledging that this is likely when opportunistic behavior is 
egregious, we suggest that modest instances of opportunism may not follow the same 
pattern. Building from in-depth interviews with alliance managers, we underscore 
how opportunism can occur at varying levels of intensity that may generate different 
performance outcomes. We argue that mildly opportunistic behavior can enhance 
performance through superior private benefits in addition to common benefits; while 
preserving or increasing future performance. By illustrating how opportunism can 
be beneficial, we demonstrate that it is a more complex behavior than extant 
strategic alliance research may imply. 
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As a core tenet of transaction cost theory, risks of opportunism in inter-firm exchanges 
have been studied extensively (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Within strategic alliances, 
opportunistic behavior is considered to be a suboptimal practice that leads to additional long-term 
costs including reduced opportunities for repeated cooperation and reputational damage across 
social networks (Axelrod, 1984; Hill, 1990). However, some firms behave opportunistically in 
alliances and escape unscathed. Our paper is motivated by the opportunity to better understand 
such instances where firms achieve self-interested gains at the partner’s expense without 
jeopardizing future prospects. For instance, in Samsung’s joint venture to develop LCD-TV panels 
with Sony, their capabilities to harvest private benefits meant that they achieved disproportionately 
large individual gains (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). In subsequent years, these resulted in a steadily 
rising share of the rapidly growing LCD-TV segment and annual revenues of $200bn for the first 
time. Over the same period, Sony’s LCD-TV market share more than halved. Yet Samsung’s 
pursuit of private benefits does not appear to have harmed their reputation with others in the 
network – they continue to enjoy alliances with key players such as Intel, Panasonic, and IBM. 
Industry examples like this suggest there is potential for a more sophisticated understanding of 
opportunism in strategic alliances. Just as cooperation may not follow a more-is-better approach 
(Bercovitz, Jap, & Nickerson, 2006), we question whether less opportunistic behavior is always 
desirable. 
To enhance our comprehension of a “rich, complex and nuanced” construct (Rindfleisch 
et al., 2010: 2), we present an analysis of relevant literature and in-depth qualitative interviews 
with alliance managers. We find that opportunism can occur at varying levels of intensity — 
ranging from mild pursuit of self-interest (absorbing knowledge in areas beyond the alliance) to 
more egregious opportunistic acts (poaching key employees). While acknowledging that egregious 
acts can lead to inferior outcomes, we suggest that milder acts will not follow the same pattern. 
Opportunism can generate short-term gains by combining joint creations with internal resources 
and capabilities (Gnyawali & Park, 2011), by applying knowledge and skills appropriated in other 
areas (Hamel, 1991), and by motivating rapid internal innovation (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). 
At modest intensities, these can be achieved while simultaneously enhancing future opportunities 
through increases in partner dependence, more rapid value creation, and the development of 
superior technological capabilities. 
Our paper makes two contributions. First, by illuminating varying levels of opportunism, 
we highlight that the ‘one size fits all’ approach often employed may not be appropriate. This is in 
line with Williamson’s (1979) seminal conceptualization and suggests a need to revisit theories 
that treat opportunism as dichotomous (‘present’ or ‘absent’). Second, we highlight instances 
where opportunism can be beneficial. This suggests that it is a more complex concept than alliance 
research has recognized. Our paper therefore extends insights concerning how firms can create 
value through alliances (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Rai, 2016).  
SAMPLE AND METHODS 
There is a dearth of research explicating the dimensions and idiosyncrasies of opportunism 
as they relate to strategic alliances. Therefore, while our paper builds from extant literature, we 
also incorporate insights from in-depth interviews with eight managers in high technology 
industries. Interviewees held senior positions where most their time was spent managing inter-firm 
alliances. They were selected because of their extensive alliance experience and hailed from 
industries including medical devices, software, IT, and data hosting, where the intangible nature 
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of advantage-generating resources means that the risks associated with opportunism are 
significant. Each interview was semi-structured, lasted 75-100 minutes, and was digitally recorded. 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Williamson defines opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile” (1979: 234). Yet, this 
definition has led to two critical misconceptions. First, Williamson intended that the concept would 
reflect varying intensities of opportunism – “it is not necessary that all agents be regarded as 
opportunistic in identical degree” (1979: 234) – but this is often lost in subsequent theory 
development. Subsequent considerations of opportunism, often adopting a game theory lens, 
implicitly treat opportunism as a dichotomous construct – one which is either present or absent 
(e.g. Hill, 1990; Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2009). Therefore, analysis rarely extends beyond the positive or negative performance implications 
generated by the black box of ‘opportunism’. Second, it is largely overlooked that the outcomes 
of opportunism are critically determined by context (Rindfleisch et al., 2010). Different levels of 
opportunism may be acceptable depending on firm and alliance level conditions and the same level 
of self-interest that is acceptable – or even expected – in a learning alliance (Hamel, 1991) may 
lead to termination in an alliance for joint development and sales (e.g., Fernandez, Le Roy, & 
Gnyawali, 2014). The term ‘opportunism’ is best reserved for actions that disadvantage other 
alliance members – not those occurring through the normal process of appropriating benefits (e.g., 
Rai, 2016). Therefore, opportunism is more appropriately defined as the pursuit of self-interest at 
the expense of other alliance partners (Das & Rahman, 2010). This definition returns to 
Williamson’s initial intention by explicitly acknowledging varying levels of intensity, while 
evaluating behavior within the firm and alliance context in which it is rooted.  
Varying levels of intensity 
Opportunism is a complex construct. Our interviews illustrate two extreme variations — 
milder pursuits of self-interest and more egregious acts. More benign forms include skills 
absorption and shielding knowledge that a partner might reasonably expect to access. This 
behavior is quite routine between alliance partners. As one manager outlined:  
“When our partner’s engineers come to our site, the priority is knowledge 
protection. They ask us to help because they don’t have the required technical 
ability. That’s an advantage that we need to preserve so we share information on 
an as-needed basis only. If a competitor or supplier does not absolutely need to 
know something, we don’t share it. It’s like being audited — answer what you’re 
asked and nothing else.” 
Such approaches are recognized in extant literature (Hamel, 1991) and are highly common 
among the managers we interviewed. More severe forms may involve poaching employees, 
misappropriating core assets, and violating secrecy agreements (Khanna et al., 1998). Another 
manager explained: 
“Before formalizing an alliance agreement, we generally share a detailed 
breakdown of our ideas for whatever problem we’re trying to solve. It contains 
internally developed technical data and there are extensive NDAs [non-disclosure 
agreements] built into the pre-alliance contract. But we had one client who was 
recycling this data to build components with other partners. We had shared under 
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assurances of non-disclosure but ultimately it was being sent back to us via a 
mutual partner. Eventually, we took action but we were burnt badly the first time.” 
This is a more severe form of opportunism and highlights the concept’s inherent 
complexities. While both behaviors illustrated are opportunistic, each will have notably different 
consequences. In the following subsections, we consider how consequences may vary depending 
on intensity of opportunism. 
Opportunism and short-term performance 
It is acknowledged that a firm acting opportunistically can achieve performance 
improvements in the short-term. As well as common benefits from joint value creation (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998), opportunistic firms can achieve additional private benefits through the combination 
of non-shared knowledge and capabilities with internal resources and capabilities (Hamel, 1991; 
Khanna et al., 1998; Rai, 2016). This can motivate internal innovation, generate process 
efficiencies, and trigger incremental improvements (Lado et al., 1997). Firms that do not pursue 
private benefits can find themselves redundant within the alliance and vulnerable in the market 
(Hamel, Prahalad, & Doz, 1989). A manager describes: 
“Working alongside our competitor, there have been many learning 
opportunities… better ways to develop processes, manufacture parts, trouble shoot 
problems, root cause analysis, increase output; and especially how be more 
efficient at achieving quality. We don’t set out to strip our partners bare of their 
knowledge, but we do learn many things that are very good for us... we even won 
some of their contracts when they were up for renewal.” 
We assume that the firm will only act opportunistically where additional private benefits 
are anticipated (Buckley & Casson, 1988; Hennart, 1991). External resources are a critical source 
of rent generation (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Garrette, Castañer, & Dussauge, 2009; Gnyawali & Park, 
2011) and a firm that pursues private benefits as well as common benefits, will achieve superior 
short-term performance relative to a firm that pursues only common benefits. Mild opportunistic 
acts like this can drive performance improvements for the firm by contributing to private value 
creation (Rai, 2016). 
Sometimes, the partner may be unaware of opportunistic behavior (e.g. Williamson, 1985) and 
therefore cannot react (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992). Where the partner is aware, they will make 
a rational decision to respond by weighing their own value creation against the cost of the partner’s 
actions. Many partners will recognize that some tolerance of the other’s mildly opportunistic acts 
is necessary to achieve their own private aims (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). As was Sony’s rationale for 
sharing their TV expertise in the S-LCD venture; “if we put up barriers, they’ll close up too” 
(Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2008: 389). Therefore, rather than opportunism as a sole determinant 
of alliance outcomes, its varying degrees are “simply a subset of total costs to be aggregated and 
then compared with the total benefits/gains in an overall calculation of the value of an 
interorganisational strategy” (Zajaz & Olsen, 1993: 133). These sentiments were echoed by the 
managers we interviewed: 
“There is a degree of ‘out for themselves’ that we tolerate with our partners. 
Every company is out for themselves at the end of the day… I suppose we are willing 
to tolerate certain levels of noncooperation depending on the partner’s importance. 
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If the venture involves something small and relatively generic, we will be less 
tolerant than a partner who is working on a large part of the supply chain that 
would take months to re-establish elsewhere. Yes, cooperativeness is important but, 
above a certain threshold, it is secondary to innovation, costs, service level — the 
overall value that the partner creates.” 
If we take the partner’s involvement in the alliance as a signal that the alliance is a source 
of value, and the opportunism is relatively mild, then tolerance may be more likely than retaliation. 
Up until a point, opportunism can open new channels for private value creation while preserving 
common benefits. However, where the firm’s opportunistic behavior exceeds a certain level, costs 
for the partner surpass the value creation benefits of the alliance. The partner may opt to terminate, 
severing the firm’s access to common benefits. More egregious forms of opportunism may also 
incite retaliation in other areas, such as overlapping input or output markets. Thus, we anticipate 
that egregious opportunism may reverse initial performance improvements available (e.g., Baum 
& Korn, 1999; Gimeno & Woo, 1996). 
Proposition 1: In an inverted-U shape, firm opportunism will increase firm performance up to a 
point, after which this effect will be reversed. 
Opportunism and future performance  
Known as the ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984), a firm can have multiple cooperative 
relationships with a range of partners over their lifetime. Firms are embedded in a dense web of 
social relations (Granovetter, 1985) and their reputation has an economic value (Fama, 1980) that 
affects their ability to engage future partners. Hill (1990) asserts that, although opportunism may 
lead to short-term gains, it will ultimately be damaging for future performance. He argues that 
opportunistic behavior erodes the potential for future interactions with the current partner 
(Axelrod, 1984), and destructs the firm’s reputation as a collaborative partner across the social 
network. While accepting this thesis when opportunistic behavior is egregious, we outline how 
milder opportunistic acts may not have the same effect.  
Having illustrated how a partner may be willing to tolerate mild acts of opportunism in the 
short-term where value creation opportunities exceed costs, this tolerance can be reasonably 
assumed to persist in the future. In addition, there are two reasons why mild opportunistic acts, as 
previously described, may actually enhance future opportunities with the current partner.  First, 
opportunism frequently involves learning and skill absorption – to the point where the firm can 
fulfill the alliance activities without the partner’s help (Hamel, 1991). This alters bargaining 
power. A partner who is not learning to the same extent becomes progressively more dependent 
on the firm and must continue to share more and more to maintain the firm’s interest. Therefore, 
paradoxically, the partner’s evolving dependence – a result of the firm’s opportunism – can 
motivate increased commitments to the cooperative relationship. Second, a proactive partner may 
also harvest private benefits themselves (Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998; Rai, 2016). This 
rivalrous dimension of the alliance can spark greater internal innovation (Lado et al., 1997) and 
make it an important and sustained source of value creation for both parties. Thus, while egregious 
opportunism will damage the firm’s future opportunities with the partner, we expect that mild 
opportunism can increase these opportunities. 
Proposition 2a: In an inverted-U shape, firm opportunism will increase future opportunities with 
the partner up to a point, after which this effect will be reversed. 
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We propose that milder opportunistic acts can also increase future collaborative 
opportunities across the network. Again, this marks a departure from extant literature suggesting 
that opportunism destructs the firm’s collaborative reputation leading to reduced collaborative 
opportunities with other partners (Hill, 1990). Information about the firm’s opportunistic behavior 
is most often transmitted to the network by the partner who has been on the receiving end (Hill, 
1990). It can be communicated either directly (information flows through network ties) or 
indirectly (litigation, termination or other visible signals). Where opportunism is mild, and 
tolerated by the partner, there can be few signals transmitted and the firm’s reputation is preserved. 
In addition, mild opportunistic acts achieve private benefits such as learning, skill absorption, and 
additional revenues to stimulate the accumulation of internal capabilities and resources. Thus, the 
firm’s attractiveness as a partner may increase where it is determined by knowledge, capabilities 
and performance (Dyer, Singh, & Kale, 2008; Hamel, 1991). This occurs because the firm has 
more to offer potential future partners – greater learning opportunities and more chances to 
combine complementary resources.  
Proposition 2b: In an inverted-U shape, firm opportunism will increase future cooperative 
opportunities with other partners in the network up to a point, after which this effect will be 
reversed. 
DISCUSSION 
Extant theory often assumes that opportunism, when present, is undesirable. This is 
excessively simplistic and overlooks complex realities of collaborative arrangements. Alliances 
involve congruent and conflicting goals (Cox, 2004; Padula & Dagnino, 2007), and partners make 
contextually bound trade-offs by weighing value creation potential against costs of opportunism 
(Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Building from a literature analysis and qualitative interviews, we highlight 
how opportunistic behavior can vary in intensity (Williamson, 1979). We illustrate how variations 
in intensity can generate different performance outcomes for the firm. While acknowledging that 
high levels of opportunism may be damaging, we find that modest intensities may not follow the 
same pattern. Mildly opportunistic acts can generate gains from private and common benefits 
while increasing future opportunities by creating partner dependence, stimulating innovation in 
the alliance, and enhancing technological capabilities. Therefore, we anticipate that opportunism 
will influence short-term and future performance in the shape of an inverted-U. Mild opportunism 
is often accepted, and perhaps even expected, but dichotomous labels of present or absent cannot 
account for this. 
Our insights offer two theoretical contributions. First, by illuminating varying levels of 
opportunism, we highlight how a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not appropriate. In line with 
Williamson’s (1979) seminal conceptualization, we illustrate that there are varying levels of 
opportunism which produce different performance outcomes. This has important implications for 
extant research, mainly from a game theoretic tradition, relying on models that treat opportunism 
as dichotomous. Our demonstration of the continuous nature of the construct challenges Hill’s 
(1990) assertion that opportunistic behavior is damaging for firms across a longer time horizon. 
When variation in the intensity of opportunism is considered, it appears that mild opportunism will 
not destruct future value creation in the same way as more severe acts. This may be true even 
where reputational effects are important (c.f. Williamson, 1985) or potential for future exchanges 
is high. By demonstrating how milder competitive acts may be tolerated in alliances, our research 
also exposes an important limitation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma model when employed to 
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approximate payoffs for interfirm alliances (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Ritala 
& Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that one partner acting 
opportunistically can capture the largest individual reward (total value minus what is eroded in 
common benefits), while mutual cooperation offers slightly smaller individual rewards but the 
largest aggregate amount. Yet our analysis suggests that behavior within the alliance is not a 
dichotomous ‘defect or cooperate’ choice as Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests. Rather, there are 
varying degrees of opportunistic acts; not all of which erode common benefits. Our proposal 
implies that more sophisticated models may be required to map the payoff structure in alliances 
where ‘defect’ and ‘cooperate’ are not the only options. 
Our second contribution stems from an illumination of how firms can simultaneously and 
sustainably pursue both common and private value creation in alliances (Rai, 2016). Traditionally, 
a relational view focuses on joint value creation (Dyer & Singh, 1998) while a learning perspective 
emphasizes private benefits (Hamel, 1991). Thus, it is unsurprising that ‘compete’ and ‘cooperate’ 
are often treated as two sides of the same coin (Chen, 2008). Yet, we demonstrate that both actions 
can coexist within a strategic alliance and potentially complement one another. For instance, fear 
of a competitive response is an excellent antidote for the inertia that accompanies unchecked 
cooperation (Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2009; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001). 
Managers seeking superior value creation may recognize that some opportunism is the price paid 
for enhanced performance and that success cannot not be measured in terms of a ‘happiness index’ 
(Hamel, 1991). By illustrating how opportunism can be beneficial, our proposal illuminates the 
complexities of how firms create value in alliances.  
In summary, we hope that our research begins to capture the dynamic nature of interfirm 
relations and the managerial challenges where value creation requires an intricate balance of 
competitive and cooperative behavior. We illuminate varying intensities of opportunistic behavior 
and demonstrate how, up to a point, opportunism may generate short-term and future performance 
benefits. This has important implications for how the concept is conceptualized and examined. We 
urge researchers to be innovative in their falsification efforts and we hope that these efforts can 
spark timely and important debate.  
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